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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff-appellant ("Sue" Varallo) and defendantappellee ("Bob" Varallo) were married for over 22 years.
During almost all of the marriage, Sue stayed out of the work
force to care for Bob and their children, and to manage their
homes (the Varallos resided in at least nine locations due to
Bob's military career).

Toward the end of the marriage, Sue

was forced to return to work when Bob lost his civilian job at
Unisys which payed him over $57,000 per year.
Bob does not deny that the reason he lost his job was
because of untruthful or incomplete polygraph answers
concerning his affair with his brother's wife.

Bob also does

not deny the trial court's finding that after he lost his job
at Unisys because of his own misconduct, he remained
voluntarily unemployed, living off Sue's income and his
military retirement benefits.
Despite these undisputed facts, Bob contends that Sue
is not entitled to her share of his retirement benefits earned
during the marriage (benefits of over $50,000 per year at the
time of trial), or to any increase in Survivor's Benefit
Protection (SBP) to replace those benefits when he dies. He
also contends that Sue is entitled to no alimony, despite the
fact that Sue's ability to earn income was impaired while she
was out of the work force caring for their family, that alimony
is necessary to bring Sue to the standard of living enjoyed by
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the Varallos during their marriage, and that Bob has the
ability to pay alimony.

Bob also argues that no income should

be imputed to him, despite his voluntary unemployment.

He also

seeks to avoid contributing to the education of his children.
Thus, after over 22 years of marriage, Bob contends
that Sue is entitled to virtually nothing from him.

Yet he

also insists that he is entitled to one half of Sue's already
minimal retirement benefits, and one half of an account
consisting solely of funds Sue inherited from her mother.
These positions are not only inconsistent but also without
legal support and must be rejected by this Court.
ARGUMENT
I.

BOB'S BRIEF MISCHARACTERIZES IMPORTANT
FACTS, RULINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT AND
APPLICABLE LAW.

Preliminarily, it is necessary to correct a number of
mischaracterizations in Bob's brief.
1.

They include:

The trial court did not award Sue any portion of

Bob's military retirement or disability benefits, which is one
of the main reasons for Sue's appeal.

Thus, Bob's arguments

that the Court awarded Sue 30% of Bob's gross benefits,
including the disability portion of these benefits, is simply
wrong.
(a) Moreover, all that Sue is asking for on this
appeal is what she is entitled to, 30% of his "disposable
monthly retired pay".

By statute "disposable monthly retired
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pay" excludes the disability payment, as well as the SBP
payment.

10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4) as amended.

See, pp. 14-15 of

Sue's opening brief and Add. "D" thereto.
(b) Although the Court apparently believed that
an award of 30% of Bob's military benefits, if made, would be
based upon the "gross" amount of benefits rather than
"disposable retired pay", this error benefitted Bob.

The two

"options" presented to the parties were based upon the Court's
belief that Sue's share of the benefits would be $1,267.50 per
month, rather than the $1,028 per month she would actually
receive (as of the time of trial, but subject to subsequent
cost of living increases).

Tr. 186-187 (Add. "A" to Sue's

opening brief); Sue's opening brief, p. 24.

Thus, under Option

1 (which was not adopted) the trial court would have awarded
Bob $850 per month in alimony, and required no increase in SBP
benefits (thereby saving Bob about an additional $280 per
month) to offset against what the court thought would be an
award of $1,267.50 per month (rather than $1,028 per month) in
retirement benefits to Sue.
2.

At the time of trial, amendments to 10 U.S.C.

§ 1448 permitted SBP protection either voluntarily or by court
order.

10 U.S.C. § 1448(b)(5)(A) (requiring person electing to

provide SBP benefits to former spouse to state "whether the
election is being made pursuant to the requirements of a court
order") (Add. "E" to Sue's opening brief); Sue's opening brief,
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p. 19. Bob's brief also makes conflicting statements about his
position on SBP benefits.

At page 24, Bob's brief states:

The defendant [Bob], by providing the
maximum survivor's benefit available, is
providing a type of retirement benefit for
the plaintiff. This is an equitable and
fair resolution by the District Court to the
problem of the division of the defendant's
retirement fund.
(Emphasis added)

However, on page 27, Bob's brief states:

"The trial court also erred when it ordered the defendant to
provide the maximum coverage available under the Survivors
Benefit Plan."

The latter statement appears to be based on an

erroneous assertion that the trial court had no power to order
maximum SBP protection.

It can.

However, the former statement

establishes that Bob now believes this component of the Order
to be "equitable and fair", thereby making his acquisition of
maximum SBP protection voluntary and not court mandated.
3.

Bob argues that the trial court erred in

directing him to continue payments to a life insurance company
Bob contended was in receivership.

However, the trial court

made allowance for the prospect of the company's financial
instability when it expressly ordered that if ". . .owing to
the financial instability of the insurance company it becomes
no longer prudent to maintain coverage under the policies. . .
defendant is ordered to obtain a substitute policy or
policies. . .with a premium equal to that now paid by
defendant. . .".
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4.

Page 34 of Bob's brief states:

"The plaintiff's

[Sue's] retirement fund was obtained from her employment with
the federal government while the parties were married.
(Tr. 7-8).H

In fact, Sue Varallo's undisputed testimony on

this point, (which begins at Tr. 6) as corrected at page 4 of
her opening brief, establishes that most of her retirement was
earned prior to marriage.

She worked in federal civil service

for four and one half years prior to the marriage (including a
six-month temporary appointment at NASA and four years with the
Census Bureau), and three and one half years during the
marriage through the time of trial (one and one half years of
which were also temporary appointments).

At the time of the

marriage Sue withdrew and contributed to the marital estate the
retirement income accrued during her four years with the Census
Bureau.

No retirement deductions were made during the

temporary appointments (and hence no retirement benefits
accrued during these appointments).

The $8,500 that the Court

ordered the parties to split was the cost to reinstate Sue's
retirement benefits for the four years she worked for the
Census Bureau prior to the marriage, and to obtain benefits for
the periods she worked as a temporary appointee.

Tr. 6-8

(Add. "A" hereto).
5.

At page 9, paragraph 10, Bob's brief states that

Sue's return to full time work in 1991 was voluntary.

In

reality, Bob told her, "that in order to support our lifestyle
[she] better get out and find a job".
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Tr. 7 (Add. "A" hereto).

6.

At pages 30-31, Bob's brief claims that his $400

per month child support payment provides Mthe majority of
support for . . ,Cara".

There is no support in the record for

this statement, and it is false.
7.

For unknown reasons, Bob's brief fails to point

out that, subsequent to the filing of Sue's opening brief, Sean
moved in with his father.

Thus, the portion of Sue's appeal

seeking child support for Sean and the right to claim Sean as a
dependent for tax purposes is moot and will not be argued
further.
II.

SUE'S SALARY WAS EVIDENCE OF THE AMOUNT
OF INCOME THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN IMPUTED
TO BOB.

There is no dispute that at the time of trial Bob was
unemployed, but capable of employment.

Any disability he has

disqualifies him from physical labor only.

It did not

interfere with his prior employment at Unisys, nor would it
compromise his ability to perform tasks required of those who
hold office jobs such as Sue's.

Tr. 98; Finding of Fact No. 8

(Add. "B" to Sue's opening brief).

Thus, the evidence and

findings of the trial court were sufficient to establish his
voluntary unemployment.

Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1025

(Utah App. 1993); See also, Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963 (Utah
App. 1994).
The real issue is not whether income should be inputed
to Bob, but how much.

Bob's brief argues that there was no
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evidence from which such an amount could be determined.
However, Bob ignores the evidence of Sue's salary, vhich, as
argued in Sue's opening brief, is the amount of income that
should be imputed to Bob.
Bob does not dispute that both have similar
educational backgrounds, i.e., college B.A. degrees.

Bob also

does not dispute that, if anything, his work experience and
training should enable him to find a better paying job than
Sue's.

Bob had 30 years experience in the military (retiring

as a Colonel) and another two years experience with Unisys, and
no time out of the work force until he lost his job at Unisys
in 1990.
In contrast, Sue worked four and one-half years in
federal civil service prior to the marriage in 1970, and a
total of only 17 months in temporary civil service positions
during the marriage (nine months at the beginning of the
marriage and eight months in 1988) until 1991.

Still, she was

able to land her position with the Bureau of Reclamation in
1991, paying $3,350 per month at the time of trial.

Although

the trial court may have been correct in finding that Bob could
not, without retraining, duplicate his salary of over $50,000 a
year at Unisys, Bob makes no argument as to why he could not
find a job paying at least what Sue earns, or why that amount
of income should not be imputed to him.
Bob cites Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(2) for the
proposition that only income from the equivalent of one full
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time job may be used to determine the amount of child support.
However, the only purpose of that statute is to prevent a
parent from being required to hold down two jobs in order to
meet a child support obligation.

The statute was not designed

to protect someone like Bob who chooses to avoid having even
one job.
Moreover, Sue does not seek to increase the trial
court's award of child support (or alimony) based upon imputed
income.

She merely argues that the trial court's failure to

impute income to Bob led the Court to deprive her of her 3 0%
interest in Bob's disposable monthly retired pay.

However, if

this Court were to accept Bob's misguided argument (addressed
further below) that the disability portion of Bob's retirement
benefit should not have been considered in determining the
amount of child support and alimony, then Sue would ask that
income be imputed to Bob for these purposes as well.
The trial court's indication that it would entertain a
modification petition if Bob does decide to return to work,
does not confront the imputation issue.

Tr. 198; Finding No. 9

(Add. "A" and "B", respectively, to Sue's opening brief).

This

arrangement provides Bob with no incentive to return to work.
He is permitted to live solely off of his retirement benefits,
earned in part through Sue's efforts and support, while she is
forced to work in order to approach a standard of living he
maintains without working.
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There is no question that the trial court erred in
failing to impute income to Bob in at least the amount of Sue's
salary.

As will be argued next, once that income is imputed to

Bob, there is also no question that Sue is entitled to 30% of
Bob's disposable monthly retired pay.
III. SUE IS ENTITLED BOTH TO 30% OF BOB'S
DISPOSABLE MONTHLY RETIRED PAY DURING
HIS LIFETIME AND TO MAXIMUM SBP
PROTECTION AFTER HIS DEATH.
As discussed above, contrary to Bob's argument, Sue is
seeking 30% of Bob's "disposable monthly retired pay", not 30%
of his gross retirement benefits, and any error by the trial
court in using Bob's gross retirement pay in calculating the
economic consequences of its two options was to Bob's
advantage.

The other arguments Bob advances on the issue of

the division of his retirement benefits and on SBP benefits
also are without merit.
One of these arguments is that the trial court
correctly ruled that Bob's life expectancy is too uncertain to
permit a present value calculation of his retirement benefits,
thereby barring a lump sum distribution.

However, as

demonstrated in Sue's opening brief at pp. 15-17, it is only
when retirement has not yet occurred, and therefore the amount
of benefits is unknown, that the present value of these
benefits may be too speculative to determine.

Woodward v.

Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982).
Once retirement has occurred, benefits are fixed and
the only remaining variable is life expectancy.
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Courts have

long recognized the reliability of mortality tables to assess
life expectancy, for example in personal injury cases where the
present value of future lost income is at issue.

In a divorce

context, Motes v. Motes, 786 P.2d 232, 234 (Utah App, 1990)
specifically holds that once retirement has occurred, the
present value of retirement benefits can be determined and made
part of the property distribution.

The spouse may receive his

or her share of the present value of retirement benefit from
other marital assets of equivalent value, when available.
Thus, it is only the present value of Sue's retirement
benefits that cannot be determined here, because she has not
yet retired.

Although Sue would prefer to receive her 30%

share of Bob's disposable monthly retired pay on a monthly
basis as it is paid to him, it is clear that Bob has sufficient
other assets to pay the $185,000 that represents her share of
the present value of Bob's disposable monthly retired pay.
P.Ex. 18; Sue's opening brief, pp. 6,17; Tr. 104 (Add. MA" to
Sue's opening brief); Finding No. 15 (Add. "BM to Sue's opening
brief) .
The only other argument that Bob appears to make
regarding his retirement benefits is that his obligation to pay
for the maximum SBP benefit resulted in what should be treated
as an equitable substitute for the award of Sue's share of his
retirement benefits.

As indicated above, this is a peculiar

argument because Bob later argues in his brief that the trial
court erred in ordering maximum SBP protection for Sue.
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More importantly, SBP benefits are no substitute for
Sue's share of Bob's retirement benefits.

The SBP benefits are

payable only upon Bob's death, while the retirement benefits
are payable only during Bob's life.

If Sue predeceases Bob,

she will receive none of the SBP benefits, after already being
deprived of her rightful share of the retirement benefits.

The

only equitable decision would have been to award Sue both her
30% share of Bob's disposable monthly retired pay (either in a
lump sum based on present value, or on a monthly basis) and the
maximum SBP protection.
Bob supplements his other SBP arguments with the
assertions that he and Sue entered into a binding contract that
Bob would provide Sue with only the minimum SBP protection, and
that the trial court had no power to change that contract.

Not

only are these assertions without legal support under the SBP
statute, they also contradict Bob's argument that the maximum
SBP protection was an equitable tradeoff for Sue's share of
Bob's retirement benefits.
Bob's assertions also fail under basic contract law
principles.

Contrary to the statement at page 28 of Bob's

brief, Sue received no "bargained for consideration" in return
for reduced SBP benefits.

Moreover, any "contract" the parties

may have made was dependent upon the marriage contract, and was
terminated when the marriage contract was terminated as the
result of Bob's philandering.
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Bob's arguments aside, the trial court made two
critical errors in its analysis of the military retirement and
related SBP issues.

The first error was in ruling that the

present value of the retirement benefits could not be
determined based upon Bob's actuarial life expectancy.

The

second error was in refusing to impute income to Bob, for
purposes of determining whether Bob could afford to pay both
Sue's share of his disposable retired pay on a monthly basis,
along with the monthly payment for maximum SBP protection.
As shown in Sue's opening brief at pp. 23-25, with a
salary equal to Sue's, Bob could pay Sue her share of his
retirement benefits on a monthly basis, pay the maximum monthly
SBP payment, meet his other existing monthly obligations under
the Decree (including child support and alimony) and still have
enough left over to live comfortably.

Of course, this scenerio

would require Bob to return to work, as Sue was required to do.
IV.

EVEN WITHOUT IMPUTATION OF INCOME, THE
UNDISPUTED FACTS AND EXPRESS AND
IMPLIED FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT
SUPPORTED THE AMOUNT OF THE ALIMONY AND
CHILD SUPPORT AWARDED TO SUE.

Bob's primary argument on the $500 per month alimony
award to Sue is not that the award was too high, but that the
trial court's findings were insufficient to support the award.
However, the record establishes that the trial court considered
the appropriate factors (i.e., Sue's financial condition and
needs, Sue's ability to meet those needs, and Bob's ability to
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pay) and that these factors support the alimony amount
(assuming no income is imputed to Bob.)
Although the formal Findings 8 and 9 (Add. "B" to
Sue's opening brief) do not expressly recite all of the
necessary factors, the undisputed evidence before the trial
court, and the court's ruling from the bench (Add. "A" to Sue's
opening brief), show that the trial court considered these
factors, and, more importantly, show the analysis that led to
the ultimate award.

This is all that is required by this

Court's decisions in Hall v. Hall, supra and Hill v. Hill,
supra.
Under Hall, express findings are not required either
as to undisputed issues, or if the express findings can be
implied from subsidiary findings on disputed issues:
Unstated findings can be implied if it is
reasonable to assume that the trial court
actually considered the controverted
evidence and necessarily made a finding to
resolve the controversy, but simply failed
to record the factual determination it made.
858 P.2d at 1025.

Indeed, for purposes of appellate review, it

is more important for the trial court to explain its analytical
processes rather than to merely parrot the magic language of a
required finding:
[W]here the court formulates detailed
subsidiary findings of fact which . . . by
themselves, show the steps by which the
court arrived at its apparent conclusion,
. . . the court's decision . . . will not be
invalidated . . . .
Id.
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In many cases, where a court fails to phrase
findings in the exact language of the
statute, the findings nevertheless reflect
methodical and extensively detailed
treatment of the facts, which is often more
insightful and helpful on appeal than a
shorter, more cursory recitation of the
exact statutory language would have been.
Such an approach frequently promotes more
meaningful appellate review by providing the
appellate court with insight into the steps
taken by the trial court in arriving at its
decision.
Id. at n.7 (citations omitted).
Here, in Finding No. 8, the Court expressly found
that, "in order to maintain the standard of living which the
parties enjoyed during their marriage, plaintiff [Sue] is in
need of support . . . in the amount of $500 per month".

It was

undisputed that Sue's standard of living had declined after she
filed for divorce and she and the children moved out of the
family home.

Tr. 34.

See, Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538,

542 (Utah 1991) [M. . . usually the needs of the spouses are
assessed in light of the standard of living they had during the
marriage" (citations omitted)].
In addition to making this ultimate finding on Sue's
need for alimony, the trial court made subsidiary findings in
its ruling from the bench regarding Sue's earnings, earning
capacity and expenses, and Bob's ability to pay alimony.

The

court found Sue's monthly income from employment to be
$3,242.42.

Tr. 194-195.

Contrary to Bob's argument that the

trial court did not consider Sue's income from other sources,
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the court then added income from her separate savings and other
investments of $401 per month, for a total of $3,643.42 per
month.

Tr. 195. The court then reduced her claimed expenses

from $2,496 per month to $2,300 per month, because of expenses
attributable to the adult children Sean and Valerie.
On Bob's side of the equation, the Court took Bob's
monthly retirement income of $4,225 and added $250 per month in
separate interest or investment income, for a total of $4,475
per month.

Id.

The Court also reduced Bob's claimed expenses

by $200, to $2,300 per month, based on a determination of what
would be reasonable post-divorce.

Id.

The Court then went on to consider Sue's education and
employment, as well as the number of years she had been out of
the work force (thereby losing the opportunity to climb the
career ladder), and her ability to earn income from her share
of the marital property distribution (which is the same as
Bob's), in evaluating both her present need for income and her
income needs upon retirement.

Tr. 196-198.

In light of all of

these factors, and without imputing any income to Bob from his
voluntary unemployment, the Court found $500 per month alimony
to be appropriate.

Tr. 198.

These subsidiary findings are similar to those
affirmed in Hill v. Hill, supra, where the defendant husband
also contended that the trial court failed to make adequate
findings concerning his ability to pay alimony.
this Court stated:
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In response,

Ms. Hill concedes that the court did not
make an express finding on Mr. Hill's
ability to pay, but notes that the court
fully considered this factor at trial. Mr.
Hill provided the court with documentation
concerning his present and historical
earnings, along with his current expenses.
The court made several references to Mr.
Hill's financial condition, evidencing a
complete understanding of the resources
available to pay alimony.
869 P.2d at 966.
According to the chart on page 18 of Bob's brief, the
net result of the alimony award was to approximately equalize
the net monthly income and expenses of the parties, before
taking into account Bob's child support and SBP obligations.
However, any amount to be credited to Sue from child support is
more than offset by the actual costs of raising a teenage
daughter.

(If any error was made by the trial court in

calculating alimony, it was in attributing equal monthly
expenses to the parties, despite the fact that Bob has only
himself to support, while Sue must support both herself and
Cara, and Sue has more withholdings from her gross salary than
Bob does from his gross retirement pay.

P. Ex. 1; D. Ex. 9.)

Also, Sue will not receive the benefit of the SBP
payment until Bob dies (assuming she outlives him). Moreover,
based on Bob's own calculations, and even without imputation of
income, there is no question that he has the means to pay the
alimony, child support and SBP payment ordered by the trial
court.
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Bob also argues that because the disability portion of
his retirement pay is his separate property, it may not be
taken into account for purposes of calculating alimony, or
child support.

This argument is nonsense, especially in light

of Bob's own argument that Sue's income from her separate
property had to be considered.

Income from all sources may be

considered in determining both financial need and ability to
pay.
1988).

See, Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah
As discussed above, the trial court considered income

from the separate property of both parties in awarding alimony.
Moreover, at trial Bob conceded that child support was
to be calculated based upon his gross retirement pay, including
the disability component, and that $393 per month in child
support was appropriate (which the trial court increased by
only $8.) Ex. "A" to Bob's trial brief (R. 97-121).

Page 10

of his trial brief also conceded that an award of alimony to
Sue was appropriate (albeit in the amount of $300 per month,
rather than the $500 actually awarded).
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that even
with the existing alimony and child support awards, Sue must
continue to work full time in order to maintain her and her
daughter's current standa

f living, while Bob may maintain

his current standard of living by remaining idle.

On the other

hand, all Bob has to do to improve his standard of living is
return to work, while there are no options available to Sue
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to improve her standard of living (or Cara's).

These facts

suggest that even if no income is imputed to Bob, the alimony
and child support awards were, if anything, too low.
V.

BOB IS ENTITLED TO NO PART OF SUE'S
RETIREMENT BENEFITS.

Bob argues that he is entitled to one-half of the
retirement benefits Sue earned during the marriage.

Of course,

this argument is undercut by Bob's opposition to an award to
Sue of one-half of the retirement benefits he earned during the
marriage.

However, even if Sue is awarded her share of his

retirement benefits, Bob should be awarded no part of her
benefits.
At first blush, it would seem reasonable that if Sue
were awarded a share of Bob's benefits, reciprocity should
apply.

[Indeed, in his Answer to Sue's Complaint at p.2, 1f 8

(R. 30-32), Bob conceded that Sue should get one-half of his
benefits and he should get one-half of hers.]

However, on the

facts of this case, reciprocity would be totally inequitable.
Although Bob was ordered to pay one-half of the amount
necessary to reinstate Sue's retirement benefits, most of this
amount is traceable to benefits accrued during her four years
of employment with the Census Bureau prior to the marriage.
Sue cashed out these benefits during the marriage and
contributed the proceeds to the marital estate.

Since Bob is

presumed to have already received one-half of these proceeds,
it is only fair that he reimburse her for this amount, plus
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interest, with no right to this portion of her retirement
benefits once she retires.
As discussed above, the portion of her retirement
benefits attributable to her employment during the marriage is
negligible.
either.

However, Bob should receive none of this portion

Sue's retirement benefits are calculated based upon a

combination of her years of service and average salary.
Because she was out of the work force for almost 20 years
during the marriage, her retirement prospects are adversely
affected in two ways.

First, she was unable to work her way up

the career ladder in terms of salary.
to accrue years of service.

Second, she was unable

See, Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S.

581, 602 (1989) (dissenting opinion of Justice O'Connor).

In

order to accrue the 30 years of service Bob has, she would not
be able to retire until age 73.
Given this scenario, it would be unconscionable to
award Bob any part of Sue's retirement benefits, which already
will be meager, especially in comparison to his.
VI.

BOB AGREED TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARD THE
CHILDREN'S EDUCATIONAL EXPENSES.

Bob's brief correctly points out that under Utah law,
he cannot be compelled to contribute toward the educational
expenses of his children after they reach age 18, absent
special circumstances.

What Bob overlooks, however, is his

agreement to contribute to such expenses.

Such agreements are

enforceable in Utah, even as to children that have reached the
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age of majority, and may be embodied in a divorce decree.
Despain v. Despain, 627 P.2d 526 (Utah 1981); Hill v. Hill, 841
P.2d 722 (Utah App. 1992).
At trial both Bob and Sue expressed a commitment to
share the costs of providing each of their children with the
opportunity to pursue educational opportunities.

At Tr.

128-130 (Add. "A" hereto), Bob testified that he was willing
and able to contribute both towards Cara's expenses at Judge
Memorial High School and Valerie's expenses at Westminster
College.

Valerie was over age 18 at the time of trial.

(Subsequent to trial, Valerie graduated from college.

To that

extent, the issue is moot, leaving for determination the
question of Cara's college expenses from age 18 through age 22
and educational costs which may be incurred by Sean, now 20
years of age.)

The trial court took Bob at his word and

embodied his agreement in the Decree.

This Court should also

enforce that agreement and uphold the Decree.
VII.

THE ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND ACCOUNT IS
SUE'S SEPARATE PROPERTY.

It is undisputed that the Royal Bank of Scotland
account (about $15,000) is made up entirely of funds received
by Sue through inheritance from her mother.

Tr. 19-21.

Sue

became determined to segregate these funds when she learned
that Bob had yet another paramour (in addition to his brother's
wife).

Id.

Bob does not contend that he augmented these funds

in any fashion or that they became commingled with marital
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assets.

Accordingly, the trial court correctly awarded Sue's

separate, inherited funds to Sue.

See, Mortensen v. Mortensen,

supra; Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1168 (Utah App. 1991).
Bob's sole claim to these funds is based on the fact
that Sue set up the account in which the bonds are held as a
joint account.

This argument is absurd.

The name or names put

on an account does not determine whether it is marital or
separate property.

See, Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah

1986); Jackson v. Jackson, 617 P.2d 338, 340-341 (Utah 1980).
According to Bob's rationale, a spouse could lay sole claim to
marital property (for example, the family home) simply by
withholding the name of the other spouse from documents
evidencing ownership.

The law does not countenance such

mechanistic and artificial tests to determine whether property
is subject to distribution upon divorce.
At page 35 of his brief, Bob goes on to argue that
establishing the account as a joint account shows that Sue
"intended for [Bob] to be a recipient of those funds should
[Sue] die while the parties were still married" (emphasis
added).

Of course, Sue did not die during the marriage, so

that any such intent is irrelevant.
Sue did not contribute this asset to the marital
estate merely by engaging in an estate planning device designed
to avoid probate.

If this were so, a spouse could again lay

claim to separate assets as marital assets, simply because they
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were the subject of a bequest to that spouse in the other
spouse's will.

Furthermore, wills and most other estate

planning devices are revocable, and nothing is more common than
to remove a divorced spouse as a death beneficiary.
Finally, at trial, Bob conceded that Sue's
inheritance, including the Royal Bank of Scotland Account, were
Sue's separate property, not part of the marital estate, and
should be awarded to her.

See, Bob's trial brief (R. 97-121)

at pp. 12, 14.
CONCLUSION
Bob's cross-appeal is nothing more than an attempt at
gross overreaching and must be denied.

Sue respectfully urges

that the Decree be affirmed in all respects, except that the
trial court be directed on remand to award Sue 30% of Bob's
disposable monthly retired pay, either in the lump sum present
value amount of $185,000, or as it is paid on a monthly basis.
Sue would prefer payment on a monthly basis.
Alternatively, Sue urges this Court to remand to the
trial court with directions to make findings on the amount of
income to be imputed to Bob, based on Sue's salary, to find
that Sue has a 30% property interest in Bob's disposable
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monthly retired pay, and to reconsider the trial court's option
nos. 1 and 2 accordingly.^
DATED this

)iJ_ day of November, 1994.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

By

Ronald E. Nehring

By V ^ ^ 7 ^ ,

JjaHk^s A . B o e v e r s
A t t o r n e y s for P l a i n t i f f
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ADDENDUM "A"

1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND DISTRICT OF THE

2

STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS

3
4
5
6
7

MERRILYN SUSAN VARALLO,

8

PLAINTIFF,
CASE NO. 924701381

9
VS.
10
FRANCIS V. VARALLO,
11
DEFENDANT.
12
13
14

BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON THE 17TH AND 18TH
DAYS OF FEBRUARY, 1993, THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CAUSE CAME ON
FOR TRIAL BEFORE THE HONORABLE JON M. MEMMOTT, DISTRICT
JUDGE, FARMINGTON, UTAH.

15
16

APPEARANCES

17
FOR THE PLAINTIFF
18
19
20
21

FOR THE DEFENDANT

RONALD NEHRING
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
CITY CENTRE T, SUITE 900
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
HAROLD J. DENT
KING, MESERVY & DENT
2120 S. 1300 EAST
SALT LAKE CITY, UT

22
23
24

JOANNE PRATT, CSR
HALL OF JUSTICE
800 WEST STATE STREET
FARMINGTON, UT 84025

25

COPY

84106

1

Q

MRS. VARALLO, MAY I ASK YOU NOW SOME QUEST1UN5

2

ABOUT YOUR OWN BACKGROUND.

3

SOMETHING ABOUT YOUR EDUCATION?

4
5

A

COULD YOU BRIEFLY TELL US

I HAVE A BACHELOR'S DEGREE IN ENGLISH FROM THE

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA.

6

Q

IN WHAT AREA WAS YOUR DEGREE TAKEN?

7

A

IN LIBERAL ARTS.

8

Q

WHAT IS YOUR WORK HISTORY?

9

A

I BASICALLY STARTED IN—MOST OF MY WORK

10

HISTORY HAS BEEN WITH THE FEDERAL SERVICE AND WITH THE

11

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

12

OF 1966 ON A TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT WITH NASA AT CAPE

13

KENNEDY.

14

AND WOUND UP WITH A PERMANENT JOB WITH THE CENSUS BUREAU

15

IN JUNE OF 1966.

16

YEARS UNTIL I MARRIED BOB AND LEFT THE CENSUS IN JUNE OF

17

'70. AFTER THAT I WORKED FOR ABOUT 15 MONTHS WITH THE

18

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY AT FORTH LEAVENWORTH ON A TEMPORARY

19

APPOINTMENT.

20

1971 UNTIL JANUARY OF 1988 WHEN I WENT BACK TO WORK AT

21

DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY IN ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA.

22

THERE FOR EIGHT MONTHS.

23

STAYED OUT OF THE WORK FORCE AGAIN ANOTHER TWO YEARS.

24

THEN I WENT BACK TO WORK JANUARY OF 1991 FOR THE BUREAU

25

OF RECLAMATION HERE IN SALT LAKE.

AND I STARTED WITH THEM IN JANUARY

I WAS THEN PUT ON THE CIVIL SERVICE REGISTER

I WORKED FOR THE CENSUS BUREAU FOR FOUR

AND THEN I DIDN'T WORK AGAIN FROM MAY OF

I WORKED

AND THEN WE MOVED TO UTAH. I

6

1

Q

DID YOUR HUSBAND HAVE ANY OPINION ABOUT

2

WHETHER YOU SHOULD BE WORKING DURING THE TIME— DURING

3

THE EARLY YEARS OF YOUR MARRIAGE?

4

A

HE DID NOT WANT ME TO WORK.

WE HAD MADE A

5

MUTUAL AGREEMENT THAT I SHOULD, IF AT ALL FINANCIALLY

6

POSSIBLE, I SHOULD STAY HOME WITH THE CHILDREN.

7

WAS NO REAL QUESTION ABOUT MY BEING ABLE TO GO BACK TO

8

WORK.

9

SUPPORT ABOUT IT.

THERE

IT WAS DIFFICULT WITH THREE KIDS AND NOT A LOT OF

10

Q

WHAT PROMPTED THE RETURN TO WORK IN 1991?

11

A

IN '91.

12

Q

YES.

13

A

OKAY.

BOB LEFT UNISYS IN AUGUST OF 1990. AND

14

IN NOVEMBER OF 1990 HE WAS STILL UNEMPLOYED.

SO HE TOLD

15

ME ONE DAY THAT IN ORDER TO SUPPORT OUR LIFESTYLE I'D

16

BETTER GET OUT AND FIND A JOB.

17

A JOB.

18

Q

SO I STARTED LOOKING FOR

DID YOU ACCUMULATE ANY RETIREMENT BENEFITS

19

DURING THE TIME YOU HAD EMPLOYMENT IN THE EARLY YEARS OF

20

YOUR MARRIAGE?

21

A

MY RETIREMENT SITUATION IS A LITTLE BIT

22

COMPLICATED.

BUT THE TIME THAT I HAD ON TEMPORARY

23

APPOINTMENTS DOES NOT COUNT TOWARD COMPUTATION OF ANNUITY

24

FOR CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT PURPOSES.

25

HAD WITH THE CENSUS WHICH WAS THE ONLY TIME THAT I HAD

THE FOUR YEARS I

1

PERMANENT PRIOR TO 1991, I WITHDREW THE RETIREMENT

2

CONTRIBUTION AFTER I WAS MARRIED.

3

CREDIT FOR THAT, I HAVE TO PAY THAT BACK WITH INTEREST.

4

IN ORDER TO GET CREDIT FOR THE TEMPORARY TIME THAT I'VE

5

HAD, I HAVE TO PAY INTO THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM—NOT

6

SOCIAL SECURITY—CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT SYSTEM IN ORDER

7

TO GET CREDIT FOR THAT TIME ALSO.

8

AND SEVEN MONTHS THAT I HAVE OF EMPLOYMENT IN FEDERAL

9

SERVICE, FIVE YEARS AND SEVEN MONTHS ARE NOT COVERED FOR

10

AND IN ORDER TO GET

SO OF THE SEVEN YEARS

RETIREMENT PURPOSES UNLESS I PAY BACK $8,511.

11

Q

HAVE YOU RECENTLY REVIEWED THE OBLIGATION THAT

12

YOU HAVE IN ORDER TO—FOR LACK OF A BETTER TERM—

13

REINSTATE YOUR RETIREMENT?

14

A

YES.

I SENT OFF TO THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

15

MANAGEMENT AND GOT A NOTICE FROM THEM ON HOW

16

WOULD COST ME TO COVER ALL THE YEARS OF SERVICE I'M

17

PRESENTLY UNCOVERED FOR, AND THAT AMOUNT IS $8,511.

18
19
20

Q

MUCH IT

DO YOU KNOW WHAT LINE OF WORK YOUR HUSBAND HAS

BEEN IN DURING YOUR MARRIAGE TO HIM?
A

WHEN WE FIRST MARRIED BOB WAS A MAJOR IN THE

21

ARMY.

HE WAS IN THE INTELLIGENCE AREA.

AND HE STAYED IN

22

THE ARMY AND STAYED IN THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD UNTIL HE

23

RETIRED THE FIRST OF MARCH OF 1988. AFTER THAT HE GOT

24

THE JOB WITH UNISYS HERE IN SALT LAKE IN AUGUST OF 1988.

25

AND HE WAS THE REGIONAL SECURITY MANAGER FOR UNISYS.

1

A

THAT'S MY RECOLLECTION.

2

Q

OKAY.

3

A

HE DOES.

4

Q

HE HAS SUCCEEDED AT BOUNTIFUL JR. HIGH SCHOOL?

BUT SEAN DOES HAVE THE SUPERIOR I.Q?

5

HE HAS BEEN EMPLOYED?

6

HISTORY?

7

A

UH-HUH.

8

Q

OKAY.

9

THANK YOU, DOCTOR.

MR. NEHRING:

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. NEHRING:

12

15

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS.

THANK YOU.

YOU MAY BE EXCUSED.

WE'RE PREPARED TO RECALL MR.

VARALLO.

13
14

YOU ARE AWARE OF AN EMPLOYMENT

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. NEHRING:
Q

MR. VARALLO, I WOULD LIKE TO RETURN TO THE

16

ANSWERS THAT YOU GAVE TO MR. DENT'S QUESTIONS CONCERNING

17

EDUCATION.

18

YOUR CHILDREN'S EDUCATION.

AS I UNDERSTAND IT, YOU TOO PUT A PREMIUM ON
IS THAT RIGHT?

19

A

YES, I DO.

20

Q

AND YOU HAVE BEEN A WILLING FINANCIAL

21

CONTRIBUTOR TO THEIR EDUCATION?

IS THAT RIGHT, SIR?

22

A

CERTAINLY UP TO THIS DATE, COUNSELOR.

23

Q

AND AS I UNDERSTAND YOUR TESTIMONY THEN, SIR,

24

BECAUSE EDUCATION IS SOMETHING THAT'S IMPORTANT TO YOU,

25

YOU WOULD BE WILLING TO MAKE THE APPROPRIATE FINANCIAL
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1

CONTRIBUTIONS TO CONTINUE YOUR CHILDREN'S EDUCATION.

2

THAT RIGHT, SIR?

3

A

THAT DEPENDS, COUNSELOR.

4

Q

WELL, SIR.

IS

ISN'T IT TRUE, SIR, THAT BASED ON

5

YOUR PLACING OF PREMIUM, YOU ARE WILLING TO TAKE OUT YOUR

6

WALLET AND PUT DOWN MONEY TO CONTINUE, FOR EXAMPLE,

7

KARA'S EDUCATION AT JUDGE MEMORIAL?

8
9

A

WELL, IT'S ONE THING,

HAVE YOUR DAUGHTER BENEFIT.

IS THAT RIGHT, SIR?

COUNSELOR, TO WANT TO

IT'S ANOTHER THING TO BE

10

ABLE TO AFFORD IT WHEN YOU DON'T HAVE THE INCOME, SIR.

11

OR IT'S PRACTICALITY AND REALITY OF CAN ONE REALLY AFFORD

12

THE LUXURY OF THE PRIVATE EDUCATION THAT'S BEEN PROVIDED

13

THUS FAR FOR OUR CHILDREN, BASED ON THE FINANCIAL ABILITY

14

FOR US TO DO THAT—FOR ME TO DO THAT.

OKAY.

15

Q

WELL—

16

A

I THINK A DIVORCE, THE SETTLEMENT OF A DIVORCE

17

AND THE OUTCOME OF THAT, COUNSELOR, I THINK YOU CAN

18

REASON THAT COULD HAVE AN IMPACT ON WHAT ONE IS ABLE OR

19

NOT ABLE TO DO IN TERMS OF THEIR OWN SUSTENANCE AS WELL

20

AS THEIR OWN CHILDREN'S SUSTENANCE, REGARDLESS OF WHAT

21

THEY DESIRE FOR THOSE CHILDREN.

22
23

Q

SIR, YOU ARE FAMILIAR WITH YOUR CURRENT

FINANCIAL SITUATION, ARE YOU NOT?

24

A

THAT'S CORRECT.

25

Q

NOW SIR, BASED ON WHAT YOU KNOW ABOUT YOUR
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1

CURRENT FINANCIAL CONDITION, DO YOU BELIEVE THAT YOU HAVE

2

THE WHEREWITHAL, TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION YOUR WIFE'S

3

FINANCIAL CONDITION, TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO KEEP KARA

4

AT JUDGE MEMORIAL?

5
6

A

YES OR NO?

AS OF THE 17TH OF FEBRUARY AND 18TH OF

FEBRUARY 1993, THAT'S CORRECT.

7

Q

YOU WOULD?

8

A

AS OF TODAY, COUNSELOR.

9

Q

ALL RIGHT. NOW, A SIMILAR QUESTION FOR

10

VALERIE AT WESTMINSTER. BASED ON THE CURRENT STATE OF

11

AFFAIRS OF YOUR RESPECTIVE FINANCIAL CONDITIONS, ARE YOU

12

IN A POSITION TO MAKE A FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION TO KEEPING

13

VALERIE AT WESTMINSTER THROUGH GRADUATION?

14

A

THE SAME ANSWER APPLIES, COUNSELOR.

15

Q

OKAY.

THE SECOND LINE OF QUESTIONING THAT MR.

16

DENT POSED TO YOU CONCERNED ALLEGATIONS MADE IN OUR TRIAL

17

BRIEF.

18

DEFINITION OF WORDS.

19

DID HAVE AN AFFAIR WITH YOUR SISTER-IN-LAW.

20

RIGHT, SIR?

21

A

IN 1987.

22

Q

AND YOU DID HAVE AN AFFAIR WITH A WOMAN NAMED

23

ROXANNE FOX.

24
25

A

AND I'M NOT GOING TO QUIBBLE

WITH YOU ON THE

BUT I WANT TO KNOW THE STUFF.

YOU

IS THAT

IS THAT RIGHT, SIR?

COUNSELOR, I WISH YOU WOULD CLARIFY AT THIS

TIME WHAT YOUR INTERPRETATION OR DEFINITION OF AFFAIR IS.
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